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COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA
PENNSYLVANIA PUBLIC UTILITY COMMISSION
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L-2008-2069114

May 16, 2011

Via Electronic Mail

The Honorable Silvan B. Lutkewitte III
Chairman
Independent Regulatory Review Commission
333 Market Street, 14th Floor
Harrisburg, PA 17101

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2011 MAY 17 A 9:25

Re: Natural Gas Distribution Companies and the Promotion of Competitive Retail Markets; **Docket No. L-2008-2069114; Regulation #57-269 (IRRC #2772)**

Dear Chairman Lutkewitte:

The Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission (PUC) initiated this rulemaking, *inter alia*, to reformulate the Price to Compare (PTC) so that natural gas consumers could make rational and apples-to-apples comparison between the cost of natural gas obtained from a Natural Gas Distribution Company (NGDC) and the various offers made by competitive Natural Gas Suppliers (NGSs). One of the key problems in making an “apples-to-apples” comparison is that, under present regulations, an NGDC’s distribution rates include the cost of procuring natural gas. As explained at page 20 of the PUC’s final rulemaking order, unless these procurement costs are removed from distribution rates, “shopping customers are being penalized with a double payment of commodity-related costs.” In other words, the shopping customer pays twice for natural gas procurement: once in the NGDC’s distribution rates, and again in the NGS’ prices (which, of necessity, include both raw commodity costs and commodity procurement costs).

The Gas Procurement Charge in section 62.223(a) of the final-form regulation addresses this problem by removing the procurement costs included in distribution rates and allowing those costs to be recovered, on a revenue-neutral basis, in the Gas Procurement Charge, which is a component of the overall Price to Compare or “PTC”. In this fashion, the customer’s bill will better reflect and identify the total cost of natural gas supply service, as a commodity, in a form that is directly comparable to the prices charged for natural gas by NGS firms. If not so included, the NGDC’s PTC will understate its true total costs.

In the letter filed May 11, 2011, by the Energy Association of Pennsylvania (EAP), it argues that the regulation would create inequity among customer classes because customers would be able to avoid the Gas Procurement Charge by shopping. EAP asserts that an NGDC’s procurement costs benefit both shopping and non-shopping customers, and therefore these costs should be paid by all customers.

However, as explained in the PUC's final rulemaking order, this position ignores competitive equity because it fails to account for the fact that NGS firms have procurement costs that, unlike for an NGDC, cannot be socialized. To make rational comparisons, the PTC must include procurement costs; otherwise, there is a competitive subsidy to non-shopping customers because the shopping customer is then required to pay twice for procurement costs. Second, as to the numerical example offered in the letter, this information is not evidence from the proceeding below, it displays an unlikely worst case scenario, and even in that worst case (100% shopping) the assumed costs do not amount to more than \$9 per year. In fact, given that the current statistics for natural gas shopping indicate that shopping is only about 8% on a statewide basis as of April 2011, an assumption of 100% shopping is not realistic. Even so, the PUC final order provided, at page 19, that it would be open to address any significant shortfall if an NGDC's rates are insufficient to cover its residual gas procurement role. Lastly, it should be noted that the NGDC's costs associated with natural gas storage and transportation capacity, which does benefit both shopping and non-shopping customers, remains bundled within distribution rates.


In similar fashion, comments filed by the Office of Consumer Advocate (OCA) asserts that the inclusion of gas procurement costs identified in the regulation at section 62.223(b)(1) would create "stranded costs" and the potential that non-shopping customers will be required to subsidize shopping customers by paying for these stranded costs. OCA Comments at 4. Again, the potential for any substantial degree of stranded costs is low, given the current low level of natural gas shopping in Pennsylvania. Nevertheless, the PUC has indicated that if NGDC rates are insufficient to cover residual procurement costs, it would be open to address those shortfalls in a subsequent rate proceeding. The PUC also notes that the computation of so-called avoided costs, as advocated by OCA, would be subject to substantial judgment and likely understate the procurement costs comparable to those incurred by an NGS operating in a competitive market.

The EAP also takes issues with inclusion of the reconciliation for over and under collections of natural gas costs from the prior period (the "e-factor) in the Price to Compare. Again, inclusion of the e-factor is reasonable and appropriate for the following reasons. First, it reflects the actual out of pocket costs that will be charge to an NGDC's non-shopping customers for the natural gas consumed. As such, including the e-factor in the PTC produces an appropriate and economically rational comparison point to the prices for natural gas offered by competitive suppliers. Second, while the e-factor reflects a reconciliation of costs from a prior period, due to portfolio purchasing strategies, the costs included in the NGDC's natural gas cost rate include various vintages and sources of natural gas purchased at different times and at different prices. As such, the argument that the e-factor costs do not match the current period market price of natural gas is misplaced; where a NGDC has a portfolio of natural gas resources, its weighted average costs *for ratemaking purposes* will not match the current market price of natural gas. However, to exclude e-factor costs from the natural gas costs actually

paid by a consumer will, in the PUC's judgment, not yield a valid comparison point and would exclude a cost of gas actually charged and paid by NGDC customers.

For these reasons, the PUC urges the Independent Regulatory Review Commission to approve these regulations that provide NGDC consumers with an improved Price to Compare when comparing the cost of natural gas provide by the incumbent utility and the prices offered by competitive suppliers.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "David E. Screven". The signature is fluid and cursive, with a long, sweeping tail that extends downwards and to the right.

David E. Screven
Assistant Counsel

cc: James Smith, IRRC (via email)